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As an environmentally friendly technology, microbially induced calcite precipitation (MICP) is widely used to improve the engineering properties of soil. The goal of this study was to investigate the effect of rainfall-induced erosion on the stability of sandy slopes which were treated by MICP technology. The observation of the erosion pattern of low concentration (0.25 M Ca) and high concentration (0.5 M Ca) of MICP-treated slopes, the mechanical behaviors of MICP-treated and cement-treated samples, and the effects of rainfall-induced erosion on the roughness of 0.5 M Ca MICP-treated and 10% cement-treated slope were studied through visual observation, unconfined compressive tests, and roughness tests. For the 0.25 M Ca MICP-treated sample, surface erosion was found to occur soon after the start of the rainfall erosion test, while for the 0.5 M Ca MICP-treated sample, the slope surface remained intact after exposing to the rainfall for 24 hours. Through unconfined compressive tests, it can be concluded that the 0.5 M Ca MICP treatment achieved a high strength, which was similar to 10% cement-treated sand. The roughness test results showed that the surface of 0.5 M Ca MICP-treated slope looked smoother than the uneroded surface after 24-h rainfall-induced erosion. On the contrary, the surface of the 10% cement-treated slope became rougher after 24-h rainfall-induced erosion. These results indicated that the MICP-treated sandy slope had lower resistance against rainfall-induced erosion compared to the cement-treated sandy slope. 

Nowadays, mobile devices have been used broadly to store and process sensitive data. To ensure confidentiality of the sensitive data, Full Disk Encryption (FDE) is often integrated in mainstream mobile operating systems like Android and iOS. FDE however cannot defend against coercive attacks in which the adversary can force the device owner to disclose the decryption key. To combat the coercive attacks, Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) is leveraged to plausibly deny the very existence of sensitive data. However, most of the existing PDE systems for mobile devices are deployed at the block layer and suffer from deniability compromises. Having observed that none of existing works in the literature have experimentally demonstrated the aforementioned compromises, our work bridges this gap by experimentally confirming the deniability compromises of the block-layer mobile PDE systems. We have built a mobile device testbed, which consists of a host computing device and a flash storage device. Additionally, we have deployed both the hidden volume-based PDE and the steganographic file system-based PDE at the block layer of our testbed and performed disk forensics to assess potential compromises on the raw NAND flash. Our experimental results confirm it is indeed possible for the adversary to compromise the block-layer PDE systems when the adversary can have access to the raw NAND flash in real world. We also discuss practical issues when performing such attacks in practice.